As a result of public outrage over lower prescription drug prices in Canada, Congress passed legislation that would allow these drugs to be imported into the United States. The lower Canadian prices reflect price regulation. Opponents of allowing these imports have argued that the U.S. will import Canadian price controls and that profits of pharmaceutical companies will be hurt. In this paper, a model is developed in which a good sold in the foreign country is subject to a negotiated price which is determined in a Nash Bargaining game. When imports back into the home country are allowed, this negotiated price also becomes the domestic price. This causes the home firm to make fewer price concession in the Nash Bargaining game. When the example of linear demand is analyzed, it is found that home firm profits are always higher when reimports are allowed.
Introduction
As a result of public outrage over lower prescription drug prices in Canada, Congress passed legislation, later signed into law, which would allow these drugs to be imported into the United States.
1 Though the Secretary of Health and Human Services later declined to implement the law, saying that it was unworkable as written, the issue of whether drug reimports from Canada should be allowed remains an important policy question. 2 Drug reimports from Canada have drawn the determined opposition of the pharmaceutical industry. 3 The price differential between Canada and the U.S. is not due to price discrimination as that term is commonly used.
Rather, it reflects the single payer system in Canada under which provincial governments can exercise monopsony power in setting prices for prescription drugs (see Anis and Wen (1998: 22) ). Thus, one argument against the import of drugs from Canada is that it will, in essence, lead to the import of Canadian price controls, erode firm profits and reduce incentives for innovation.
In this paper, a simple partial equilibrium model of trade is developed in which there is a home country monopolist which can potentially sell in the home and foreign market. In the foreign market, price determination is modeled as a Nash Bargaining game between the firm and the foreign government. In the home market, the monopolist is free to charge its profit maximizing price. Under the first regime analyzed, reimport into the home country of goods sold in the foreign country is not allowed. Under the second regime, reimport is allowed, so that the negotiated foreign price becomes the domestic price as well.
1 See the Chemical Market Reporter, October 30, 2000, pp. 15 for a report on the legislation. There have been many articles in the popular press about prescription drug prices and the fact that they are higher in the U.S. than in other countries. See, among others, Newsweek, September 25, 2000. 2 In declining to implement the law, Donna Shalala cited safety concerns in the bill as written (Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2000, pp. A2 ). I will not address safety concerns in this paper, but will instead assume that these could be addressed by appropriately formulated legislation. 3 As the bill was taking shape Jeff Trewhitt, a spokesman for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America remarked, "This was a bad idea before and it's still a bad idea." (Washington Post, October 5, 2000 pp.A4) Allowing reimports back into the home country will cause the domestic monopolist to bargain harder in the Nash bargaining game. 4 As a result, profits earned by the monopolist may not fall when reimports from the foreign country are allowed. For the case of linear demand, it is shown that the monopolist's profits always rise when reimport is allowed back into the home country. Allowing reimport into the home country always raises consumer surplus in the home country, so under linear demand, we are guaranteed that allowing reimport into the home market raises home welfare.
If we do not restrict ourselves to linear demand, but instead assume that the foreign government has all of the bargaining power in the Nash game, we again find that allowing reimports into the home country raises home welfare. Profits of the monopolist are unchanged when reimports are allowed, but domestic prices fall, and consumer surplus rises.
Some caveats to the analysis are discussed in the conclusion. While the analysis does not
show that profits of the monopolist always rise when reimports are allowed, it does show that this is a possible outcome. The framework developed in this paper can serve as a basis for further analysis of this important policy question.
The No Reimport (NR) Regime
A firm in the home country produces a commodity Q which can be thought of as a pharmaceutical product. Since the firm has patent protection on this product, it acts as a monopolist. The development process is not modeled in this paper, but presumably the firm bore large sunk costs of development in bringing this product to market. The marginal cost of production is the constant C. The good may be sold in the home and foreign markets. The exchange rate is constant and normalized to 1. Assume that the two markets are at a similar level of development, so that except for a scaling parameter k>0, demand is the same in the home and foreign market. Thus, in the home and foreign markets demand is given by Q(P) and kQ (P*) respectively, where Q'(P) <0. Profits on domestic sales are Π(P)=(P-C)Q(P). The assumptions on cost and demand ensure that profits on foreign sales are given by kΠ(P*)=k(P*-C)Q(P*).
This is a partial equilibrium analysis and any income effects on demand stemming from changes in the trade policy regime are ignored.
The assumption that, except for a scaling factor, demand is the same in the home and foreign countries can be justified by the fact that the legislation passed by Congress only allowed for reimports from the EU, Canada, Japan and Australia (Chemical Market Reporter, October 30, 2000, pp. 15 ). All of these are highly developed countries with similar levels of income.
Since reimports of the good back into the home country are not allowed, perfect market segmentation is possible under the NR regime. Because of the assumption made on demand, the monopolist would choose to charge the same price in both markets if it were free to set prices in the foreign country. Instead prices are negotiated in the foreign market in a Nash bargaining game. Thus, the firm earns monopoly profits Π M in the home market and the profits kΠ(P*) in the foreign market, where P* is a negotiated price. In addition, the negotiated price determines consumer surplus in the foreign country, kCS(P*).
The negotiated price must exceed the constant marginal cost of production C, otherwise the domestic firm is better off reverting to its threat point of no sales under which it earns zero profits. We will also assume that the domestic firm commits to meet foreign demand, whatever its level, at the negotiated price. Since P≥C, this assumption plays no role in this section, but will customers. See Shapiro (1989: 394) and the references cited therein.
be of some importance in the next section, where goods sold in the foreign country can flow back over the border into the home country.
5
The foreign government would like to maximize consumer surplus in its country, while the monopolist would like to maximize profits from sales in the foreign market. In the absence of an agreement, profits and consumer surplus are both zero. 6 Thus, zero is the threat point for both the domestic firm and the foreign government. The Nash bargained price is found from the solution to
where α reflects the bargaining power of the foreign country. The first order condition to this problem implies *) (
where the prime superscript denotes a derivative. 8 Let the price which solves (2) be denoted
The results here depend in a very obvious way on α. If α=1, then we must have P=C,
where Π(C) = 0. This reflects that fact that the foreign government has all the bargaining power 5 Presumably Canadian politics would not allow U.S. pharmaceutical firms to create shortages of prescription drugs in Canada. 6 This assumes that the foreign country can prevent its citizens from purchasing at the monopoly price in the home country in the event a bargain is not reached. If this were not so, the domestic monopolist could refuse to bargain with the foreign government and simply sell at the monopoly price to foreign citizens who make purchases in the home country. Since Canadian prices are below US prices for prescription drugs, the assumption seems justified. 7 In the original Nash bargaining game, bargaining power is set to 1/2 for each party. Equation (1) is the standard a generalization of Nash (1953) . Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998) use the Nash bargaining game to model negotiations between the government and an industry lobby which seeks trade protection. Wes (2000) uses the Nash bargaining game to model bargaining between an upstream and downstream firm in the context of an international trade model. 8 Recall that CS'(P*) = -Q(P*).
when α=1. If α=0, we must have Π'(P*) = 0, which means that the home firm charges the monopoly price in the foreign market.
Under the NR regime, total profits for the monopolist are given by ) (
Later in the paper, the expressions in (2) and (3) will be used to help compare firm profits under the reimport (R) and NR regimes.
3. The Reimport Regime
The Nash Bargaining Game
Under the R regime, the negotiated price in the foreign country becomes the price in the home country as well, due to the ability to reimport the good. There are no transportation costs so we assume that the law of one price holds for the good in question. Price concessions by the domestic monopoly in the Nash bargaining game are much more costly than in the NR regime, because they affect the domestic market as well as the foreign market. As a result, we should expect the domestic firm to drive a harder bargain in negotiations with the foreign government.
While this will tend to help firm profits, the lower price in the domestic market under the NR regime will tend to hurt firm profits. Thus, the overall effect on firm profitability appears to be ambiguous.
The home firm's surplus from being able to sell in the foreign market is (1+k)Π(P*) -
where (1+k)Π(P*) reflects profits in both the home and foreign market when reimports are allowed and Π M reflects the threat point of only selling in the home market. Thus, the price derived from the Nash bargaining game solves
Equation (4) is identical to equation (1), except that the -Π M term is implicit in equation (1).
Without reimports, profits from home sales are always Π M , whether or not a bargain is reached.
As a result, Π M is netted out of the expression in equation (1). When reimports are allowed, profits on home sales depend upon the bargain reached in the Nash game. As a result, Π M is not netted out of the expression in equation (4).
The first and second order conditions from the maximization problem in (4) imply
The expression (6) will be denoted by Γ in the comparative statics which follow.
Denote the price determined from (5) as * R P . This price depends upon the bargaining power and size of the foreign country (α and k) in an intuitive way. Total differentiation of (5)
The negotiated price is decreasing in both the bargaining power and size of the foreign country.
When the foreign market is large relative to the home market, the firm is hurt relatively less in the home market by price concessions. As a result, the negotiated price is lower.
Under the R regime, profits of the domestic firm are
A Note on Policy Evaluation
Typically in a partial equilibrium setting such as this, the welfare effects of changes in policy are evaluated by summing the changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus and government revenue. This is not an appropriate standard here, since there are clearly unmodeled expenditures on the innovation of new drugs which would be affected if firm profits fall. The effect on firm profits from moving to the R regime are ambiguous, but the effect on consumer surplus is unambiguous. Under the NR regime, domestic consumers pay the monopoly price, while in the R regime, they pay the monopoly price only in some limiting cases. In all other cases, they pay a strictly lower price. Thus, the main focus of the policy evaluation will be on firm profits. If these rise, home welfare is considered to have risen. If firm profits are unchanged, home welfare still rises as long as home consumers pay less than the monopoly price under the R regime. If firm profits fall, then regardless of the effect on consumer surplus, we will consider home welfare to be lower. This is a conservative standard which gives a small bias against a finding of a welfare improvement when moving from the NR regime to the R regime.
Limit Results
A policy evaluation requires comparing profits under the R and NR regimes (compare (9) with (3)). With a general demand function Q(P*), we can only make this comparison for limiting values of α. When α=1, the foreign government has all the bargaining power, and the domestic firm is unable to obtain surplus from sales in the foreign country under either regime. From equation (2), under the NR regime, the domestic firm is forced into marginal cost pricing in the foreign country and earns zero profits from sales there. Total profits are
, the monopoly profit from sales in the domestic market. From (5), under the R regime with α=1, we again have total firm profits
Thus, firm profits are equal under the two regimes. However, the price to home consumers is lower under the R regime, since they now pay the price negotiated in the foreign market. As a result, consumer surplus and home welfare both rise in the move to the R regime. This surprising outcome is summarized as Result 1.
Result 1: When all bargaining power resides with the foreign government (α=1), home welfare is higher under the R regime.
When α=1, the domestic firm earns zero profits on foreign sales and so is already pinned to its minimum profit level Π M . Under the R regime, the negotiated foreign price must exceed C by enough to make up for the firm's lost profits on domestic sales. Now suppose that all bargaining power lies with the domestic firm so that α=0. Equations (2) and (5) both require that Π'(P*) = 0 in order to be satisfied when α=0. This implies that the domestic firm earns monopoly profits in both markets (= (1+k)Π M ) under both regimes. Thus, firm profits and consumer surplus are both unchanged when we move from the NR regime to the R regime. This analysis is summarized as Result 2.
Result 2: When all the bargaining power resides with the domestic firm, home welfare is the same under the NR and R regimes.
Thus, for extreme values of the bargaining parameter, the model gives unambiguous answers about the effects from moving from an NR regime to an R regime. When the foreign country has all the bargaining power (α=0), home welfare is higher under the R regime. When the home firm has all the bargaining power (α=1), home welfare is the same under the two regimes. We are unable to make general statements about the effects on home welfare from moving to the R regime for intermediate values of α. To gain further insight into this question we examine the case of linear demand in the next section.
Comparing the R and NR Regimes with Linear Demand
Assume that the demand function takes the form
Using (10), it is straightforward to derive the following expressions:
To obtain the price under the NR regime, substitute the expressions in (10) and (11) into equation (2) and solve for price and quantity to get
Substitute the expressions in (12), plus (11d) in (3) to obtain total profits under the NR regime:
When α=0, the firms earns (1+k)Π M and when α=1, the firm earns Π M (i.e., it earns monopoly profits in the home market and zero profits abroad).
Substitute the expressions in (11) into (5) to obtain price and quantity under the R regime.
10 There is a great deal of algebra involved in the derivation of (14). The correctness of (14) can be verified from (5).
Use (10) and (11) in (5) and manipulate to get ) Substitute for P and Q from (14) to verify that the left-hand side and right-hand side of this equation are equal as required by (5).
Substitute (14a) and (14b) into (9) to get
A move to the R regime from the NR regime raises firm profits if and only if
. Subtract (13) from (15) and simplify to find
where the strict inequality holds for 0<α<1. Note that as stated for the general case, when we have the extreme values α=0 or α=1, profits are equal under the two regimes.
Thus, in the linear case, for interior values of α, firm profits are always higher under the R regime when compared with the NR regime. Allowing reimport back into the home country causes the domestic firm to bargain harder in the Nash game which determines the price of the good it sells. As a result, profits rise on foreign sales. However, profits fall on domestic sales, as allowing for reimports pushes the domestic price below the monopoly price. In the case of linear demand, the first effect outweighs the second and firm profits always rise for interior values of α. For α=1, firm profits are unchanged under the R regime, but domestic consumers pay a lower price. 11 Thus domestic welfare is higher in this case as well.
This analysis is summarized as Result 3:
Result 3: In the case of linear demand, firm profits are higher under the R regime for 0<α<1, while home welfare is higher for 0≤α<1. For α=1, home welfare is the same under the R and NR regimes.
In the movement from the NR to R regimes, prices rise abroad and fall at home. Why, under linear demand, is the rise in profits at abroad greater than the fall in profits from domestic sales? First, because the markets are identical, except for a scaling factor, the domestic firm would ideally like to charge the same monopoly price in each market. In a world with unrestricted markets, there are no motivations for the firm to engage in price discrimination.
Second, under the NR regime, the domestic price maximizes profits, while the foreign price is less than its profit maximizing level. As a result, a small reduction in the home price will have no first order effect on profits, while a small increase in the foreign price will lead to a first order increase in profits. 12 This does not prove that a move to the R regime raises firm profits for all demand functions, because the regime shift results in a discrete rather than an infinitesimal change in prices. Still, once this intuition is understood, the results under linear demand should not be viewed as surprising.
Conclusion
In this paper a model is developed in which foreign sales are subject to a negotiated price, while the domestic firm is free to set the monopoly price in the home market. Contrary to our initial intuition, home firm profits do not necessarily fall when reimports are allowed from the foreign country. When reimports are allowed, the foreign negotiated price becomes the domestic price as well. As a result, the home firm more firmly resists price concessions in the Nash bargaining game. If this effect is sufficiently strong the firm profits can actually rise in the move to the reimport regime. When demand is linear, profits will always rise in the move to the R regime unless α takes on an extreme value, in which case they are unchanged.
If it is believed that the foreign government has all the bargaining power in setting the negotiated price, then home welfare always rises in the move to the R regime. While home firm profits are unchanged in this case, the prices paid by domestic consumers are lower under the R regime. This is true not just for the linear demand function, but for the general demand function as well.
Why, in light of the results of this paper, do pharmaceutical firms strongly resist allowing import of drugs from Canada into the U.S.? There are several issues which would need to be addressed in any further policy analysis of this issue. First, while the intuition developed in the previous section gives some presumption that profits will rise in the move to the R regime, this has only been shown to definitely hold for the case of linear demand. Future work will be needed to determine if this result is robust to other demand specifications.
Second, pharmaceutical firms make sales in many foreign markets, and in some of these markets, there are profit maximizing incentives to engage in price discrimination. Allowing imports from these countries back into the U.S would destroy the ability of these firms to engage in such profit maximizing price discrimination. 13 It is worth noting that the recent legislation passed by Congress only allowed reimports from the EU, Canada, Japan and Australia (Chemical Market Reporter, October 30, 2000, pp. 15 ).
In addition, there are an existing set of prices which have already been negotiated under the NR regime. The pharmaceutical companies will take a capital loss if prices negotiated under the NR regime were allowed to prevail under the R regime.
